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IndonesiaLand degradation has been a major political issue in Java for decades. Its causes have generally been
framed by narratives focussing on farmers’ unsustainable cultivation practices. This paper causally links
land degradation with struggles over natural resources in Central Java. It presents a case study that was
part of a research project combining remote sensing and political ecology to explore land use/cover
change and its drivers in the catchment of the Segara Anakan lagoon. Historically rooted land conﬂicts
have turned the land into a political battleﬁeld, with soil erosion being the direct outcome of the political
struggles. Starting from an analysis of environmental changes using satellite images and historical maps,
the research explored a history of violent displacements in the frame of a series of brutal insurgencies and
counterinsurgencies in the 1950/60s. In these struggles over national political power, entire villages were
erased, and peasants’ land was appropriated by the state. This political history is ‘inscribed’ in today’s
landscape. The contested land comprises some of the most erosion-prone sites in the entire catchment
of the lagoon. The landscape of erosion is a landscape of conﬂict and a symbol of historical violence
and injustice. In line with our research in other parts of the catchment, the case study presented here
challenges dominant political discourses about the nature of upland degradation in Java. It provides
insight into still unresolved and underexplored chapters of Indonesian history and presents a strong plea
for combining land use change science and (historical) political ecology.
 2014 The Author. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-SA license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/).Introduction
Since Blaikie and Brookﬁeld’s calls to explore the political-
economic forces that shape resource use decisions and land use
patterns (Blaikie, 1985; Blaikie and Brookﬁeld, 1987), political
ecologists have greatly contributed to a better understanding of
the nature of land degradation. Linking environmental conditions
and changes with political, social and economic structures, power
relations, and patterns of resource access and control, they have
questioned partly long-standing narratives about the causes of
land and other kinds of environmental degradation (see, for
example, Batterbury et al., 1997; Brookﬁeld, 1999; Forsyth, 1996;
Forsyth and Walker, 2008; Ives and Messerli, 1989; Klein, 2002;
Leach and Mearns, 1994; Preston et al., 1997). In many cases, they
have challenged neo-Malthusian explanations, focussing on
population pressure, and the one-sided blaming of farmers’
cultivation practices for environmental degradation as simplistic
political narratives or ‘environmental orthodoxies’ (Forsyth, 2003,
Leach and Mearns, 1994).In Java, one of the global hotspots of erosion and sedimentation,
simplistic narratives continue to dominate societal discourses
about upland degradation, river water ﬂows and coastal
sedimentation. After decades of political interventions aimed at
reducing soil erosion in the island’s uplands, and more than a quar-
ter century after Blaikie and Brookﬁeld’s (1987) ‘Land Degradation
and Society’, population densities and upland farmers’ allegedly
unsustainable cultivation practices (cf. Sutadipradja and
Hardjowitjitro, 1984) still dominate related discussions in state
authorities and universities. These narratives are linked to neo-
Malthusian environmental discourses and political interests. By
distracting attention from exploring other causal factors of upland
degradation and coastal sedimentation, i.e. by narrowing research
agendas, these framings have been self-perpetuating. Also the lack
of intersection between scientiﬁc communities, such as soil and
land use change scientists and political ecologists, has contributed
to the persistence of the misleading narratives.
In this context, research building on methods from different
disciplines can be particularly fruitful. The case study presented
here was part of a larger research endeavour that combined remote
sensing, land use/cover mapping and historical cartography with
social-scientiﬁc inquiry to explore land use and land cover changes
(LUCC) and their drivers in the catchment area of the Segara
Anakan lagoon, which is situated on Java’s south coast. The case
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over natural resources and land degradation. It challenges estab-
lished narratives about the drivers of upland degradation and
makes a strong case for a historical political ecology (cf. Davis,
2009). Departing from an analysis of LUCC, the research unravelled
historically rooted struggles over land that have literally turned it
into a political battleﬁeld, with soil erosion being the outcome of
the political struggle. Bare, erosion prone slopes are the immediate
result of ongoing struggles over land. Documenting the intricate
historical roots of the land conﬂict, the research provides insight
into local dynamics of the unresolved and little documented vio-
lent history of Indonesia in the 1950/60s. A series of insurgencies
and counter-insurgencies related to the Dar’ul Islam rebellion
and the anti-communist massacres during these two decades not
only produced political forests cleared of people (cf. Peluso and
Vandergeest, 2011, Vandergeest and Peluso, 2011), but in the long
run created conﬂicts resulting in erosion-prone slopes cleared of
trees. Following a brief review of related literature and an outline
of the methodological approach used, the paper reveals the
landscape of erosion as a landscape of conﬂict and a symbol of
unresolved historical violence and injustice.Soil erosion in Java’s uplands: fragmented knowledge
Java, partly as a result of natural processes, exhibits some of the
highest erosion and sediment yields worldwide (Walling and
Webb, 1996) and has for decades been a hotspot of political inter-
ventions aimed at reducing soil erosion. The expansion of certain
forms of agriculture has undoubtedly contributed to massively
increased erosion rates in parts of the island (Dijk et al., 2004,
Donner, 1987, Nibbering and Graaff, 1998, Palte, 1989, Purwanto,
1999). One of the most prominent examples is the highly proﬁtable
but ecologically destructive potato cultivation on the Dieng Plateau
(cf. Lavigne and Gunnell, 2006, Rudiarto and Doppler, 2013).
However, in other parts of Java, one-sided blaming of farmers’ cul-
tivation practices is not substantiated by empirical evidence. It has
rather distracted attention from numerous other drivers of acceler-
ated erosion and sedimentation (cf. Diemont et al., 1991,
Schweithelm, 1989), and is partly a political strategy that has for
many decades served as justiﬁcation for the exclusive management
of state forest territories by the state forest company and for
keeping people out of these forests (cf. Galudra and Sirait, 2006,
Lukas, 2013, Peluso, 1992).
The widespread neglect of contested state forest territories and
of the roles of socio-political structures and processes, including
questions of resource access and control, in soil and LUCC studies
has contributed to the persistence of these narratives. In line with
the framing of upland degradation as a result of population pres-
sure and unsustainable farming practices, and partly embedded
in related political interventions, most research on soil degradation
and mitigation strategies in Java has focussed on farmers’ agricul-
tural plots (e.g. Dijk et al., 2004, Palte, 1989, Purwanto, 1999),
while excluding disputed state forests from analysis (for an excep-
tion see Savitri, 2006); and LUCC studies may include demographic
dynamics as explanatory variable but exclude land tenure (e.g.
Verburg et al., 1999). Outstanding in terms of linking LUCC analysis
and societal dynamics is the research conducted by Lavigne and
Gunnell (2006), which focussed on Java’s montane forests and vol-
canoes. But the scope of the few LUC(C)2 analyses that have been
conducted in the catchment area of the Segara Anakan lagoon
(Astisiasari, 2008, Prasetyo, 2004), one of Java’s hotspots of soil
conservation efforts, was conﬁned to remote sensing techniques2 The abbreviation LUC(C) refers to both land use and land cover (LUC) and land use
and land cover change (LUCC).without adequate ground truthing and did not include any empirical
analysis of the causes of land use and land cover patterns and
changes.Struggles over resources ‘inscribed’ in physical landscapes –
linking land use change science and political ecology
In addition to politically conﬁned research foci, lack of intersec-
tion between scientiﬁc communities, such as soil and LUC(C) scien-
tists and political ecologists, may contribute to the persistence of
environmental narratives (cf. Turner, 2003). Though LUC(C) science
and political ecology share much common ground (Turner and
Robbins, 2008) and have been fruitfully combined in other parts
of the world (e.g. Elliott and Campbell, 2002, McCusker and
Ramudzuli, 2007), their problem framings and analytical
approaches may differ considerably (Turner and Robbins, 2008).
While LUC(C) and soil science may not (sufﬁciently) incorporate
aspects like (historical) socio-political developments (McCusker
and Ramudzuli, 2007) or questions of resource access and control,
political ecology may sometimes not pay much attention to LUC(C)
and other bio-physical environmental conditions and dynamics
(Walker, 2005, Zimmerer and Bassett, 2003). Different from LUC(C)
science, which usually aims at systematically assessing area-wide
LUC(C) and their immediate and (mainly theory-based) distal
causes, political ecologists typically select cases ‘‘as informed by
theory that stresses the role of distal or exogenous processes that
usually operate to disadvantage local land managers and are often
captured in social conﬂict and land or resource degradation’’
(Turner and Robbins, 2008:303).
The effects of such processes, or more broadly of any societal
structures and dynamics, on physical landscapes can be seen as
‘inscriptions’. Shedding light on the effects of power relations on
the environment, Bryant and Bailey (1997:43) noted that the shap-
ing of natural resource uses by powerful actors is often visibly
‘inscribed’ in the environment, for example, in the form of planta-
tions or dams, while the patterns of resistance of the less powerful
‘‘are often more difﬁcult to discern’’. The forms of such resistance
may include ‘illegal’ exploitation of resources (Bryant and Bailey,
1997), which has been a widespread phenomenon in Indonesia’s
state forests for decades (Nibbering, 1988, Peluso, 1992); uprooting
of plantation trees (see Gerber, 2010); or forest clearance in
national parks (Bryant and Bailey, 1997:43). Some of the forest
ﬁres in Madagascar resulting from poorer farmers burning out of
frustration about richer farmers’ tree plantings which establish
legal claims over land (Kull, 2002, 2004) can be seen as ‘inscrip-
tions’ of struggles over resources in the physical landscape. Exam-
ples of such ‘inscriptions’ of resistance are also found in Peluso’s
(1992) in-depth study of struggles over forest land and trees in Java
from colonial times until the 1980s and in Bryant’s (1997) political
ecology of forestry in Burma. The ‘inscriptions’ of struggles over
resources, or more broadly of societal structures and dynamics,
in physical landscapes are forming the intersection of LUC(C) sci-
ence and political ecology.
Choosing an analysis of LUC(C) as the starting point of the
research and then exploring the drivers of the observed changes
using political ecology informed social-scientiﬁc inquiry contrib-
utes to soil and LUC(C) science by providing knowledge on and
directing attention to the (often neglected) roles of socio-political
structures and processes. At the same time, it integrates bio-phys-
ical conditions and dynamics into political ecology. The often lim-
ited engagement of political ecology scholarship with actual
environmental conditions and dynamics has been critically noted
and discussed by a number of authors (Nygren and Rikoon, 2008,
Vayda and Walters, 1999, Walker, 2005, Zimmerer and Bassett,
2003). If we see, with Paulson et al. (2004:17) ‘‘[p]olitical ecology’s
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physical sciences to address environmental changes, conﬂicts,
and problems’’, the (re-)integration of bio-physical conditions
and changes into political ecological inquiry seems highly desir-
able. One effective approach to this end is to choose bio-physical
conditions or changes as the starting point of inquiry and then con-
struct ‘‘causal histories of interrelated social and biophysical
events’’ without rigid a priori assumptions (Walters and Vayda,
2009:534, outlining the concept of ‘event ecology’), though keep-
ing in mind core political ecology questions, and applying them
where relevant. The case study presented here was part of a
research project that followed this approach, with an area-wide
analysis of LUCC as the starting point of inquiry. In this way, phys-
ical environmental conditions and changes, i.e. LUCC and degrada-
tion, could directly be linked to struggles over the access to and
control of land.Research methods
The case study presented here was part of a larger research
endeavour covering the entire catchment area of the Segara
Anakan lagoon. This shallow coastal lagoon (see Fig. 1) has been
heavily impacted by riverine sediment input (Lukas, Submitted
for publication, White et al., 1989, Yuwono et al., 2007). Its catch-
ment area has thus become a hotspot of political interventions
aimed at tackling upland degradation, though with limited results.
Against this backdrop, our research explored the dynamics and
drivers of LUCC and land degradation throughout the catchment
area. This research combined remote sensing, historical cartogra-
phy and land use/cover mapping with social-scientiﬁc research
methods.
In a ﬁrst step, areas with LUCC were identiﬁed, based on visual
interpretation of satellite images and the results of land use/cover
mapping. For this purpose, a series of satellite images (Landsat
MSS, TM, ETM and SPOT) taken between 1976/78 and 2007/2011
was acquired and georeferenced based on recent topographic
maps. GPS-facilitated land use/cover mapping was carried out
throughout the entire catchment area of the lagoon. False colourFig. 1. Following an analysis of land use and land cover change (LUCC) in the entire catch
on the drivers of LUCC were carried out in various parts of the catchment area. The area ocomposites generated from the green, red and near infrared bands
of the satellite images, the results of the land use/cover mapping
(GPS tracks, photographs, and notes), and the topographic maps
were overlayed, using ArcGIS. Flickering between images,
differences particularly in tone, texture, patterns and shapes were
identiﬁed and combined with the results of the land use/cover
mapping and the intimate knowledge of the area (cf. Campbell
and Wynne, 2011, Lillesand et al., 2008). In this way, a total of
297 LUCC areas were identiﬁed and delineated throughout the
catchment area. These LUCC areas were overlayed onto topo-
graphic maps (scale 1:25,000), partitioned into map sheets and
used in printed form during the social-scientiﬁc case studies con-
ducted thereafter.
These case studies, which were mainly aimed at analysing the
dynamics and drivers of LUCC, covered 60 of the 297 LUCC areas
identiﬁed. In selecting case studies, the aim was to cover different
parts of the catchment area, some of the hotspots of LUCC and
erosion-prone land, and a wide variety of different cases. To further
expand the temporal scale of analysis, historical topographic maps
from the early 20th century were acquired for the case study areas,
scanned, georeferenced and overlayed with the contemporary
topographic maps and the satellite images. The case studies com-
prised transect walks and semi-structured interviews with repre-
sentatives of district and sub-district governmental organisations,
the state forest corporation, NGOs, and village administrations as
well as with community groups, farmers, elderly people, and other
village residents. An inductive approach was taken, with inter-
views mainly comprising broad, open-ended questions, especially
during the ﬁrst part. At the same time, the results of the satellite
image processing (the LUCC maps) were, usually during the last
part of the interviews, incorporated into the discussion. In this
way, the combination of LUCC science and (historical) political
ecology, or more broadly of remote sensing and social-scientiﬁc
inquiry, provided scope not only for directly linking information
about physical environmental changes and related social dynamics
but also for constant cross-validation and cross-fertilisation. Many
of the socio-political drivers and events would not have been
uncovered without the area-wide analysis of LUCC, and vice versa,
certain physical changes would perhaps not have been revealedment area of the Segara Anakan lagoon using satellite images, case studies focussing
f the case study presented in this paper is located north of the Segara Anakan lagoon.
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satellite images, most of the insightful cases of environmental deg-
radation directly resulting from (historically rooted) struggles over
resources would not have been uncovered. Taken together, many
of these cases challenge common assumptions about upland deg-
radation in Java.
The following is an in-depth account of one of the case studies
with a particularly intricate history. Departing from the analysis of
satellite images and land cover mapping, the research that com-
prised 20 interviews, a number of group discussions, and two
extensive transect walks explored the causes of LUCC and degrada-
tion, which were of a socio-political nature. Step-by-step, this
approach disclosed a history of violent displacements in the frame
of a series of insurgencies and counterinsurgencies that were part
of struggles over national political power and that have barely
been documented to date.A landscape of displacement, repression, rebellion, and erosion
Starting point of the research: LUCC and erosion
Based on the satellite images and land cover mapping, a hilly
area north of the village of Binangun (see Fig. 2, LUCC area A),
Sub-district Kawunganten, District Cilacap was identiﬁed as one
of the most erosion-prone sites within the catchment of the Segara
Anakan lagoon. This site is situated only 15 km north of the lagoon,Fig. 2. Based on satellite image analysis and land cover mapping, a hilly area north of the
catchment area of the Segara Anakan lagoon (LUCC area A). A second erosion prone lanwithin the catchment of the Cikonde River, a tributary of the
Cimeneng River, which drains into the lagoon. The widely treeless,
partly very steep slopes of this site were mainly cultivated with
annual crops, like cassava and maize. Without much tree cover
and without ﬁeld terraces (Fig. 3), large parts of this hill area were
heavily affected by soil erosion, which was clearly indicated by the
exposed roots of annual crops and thick layers of recently depos-
ited sediments in the adjacent streams. Deforestation in the hills
surrounding Binangun was linked by a number of respondents to
the increased frequency of ﬂooding observed during recent years.
The indication of deforestation during the past decade detected
in the satellite images, together with a short ﬁeld visit indicating
that villagers cultivated annual crops on steep slopes without
any means of soil conservation, could have led to the misleading
conclusion that it simply is, as suggested by established discourses,
upland farmers’ unsustainable farming practices that are the root
cause of soil erosion. However, combining analysis of satellite
images with inductive, open-ended social-scientiﬁc inquiry pro-
vided a contrasting, much more complex and more insightful
counter-narrative.
Since it constituted some of the most-erosion prone land within
a major regional hotspot of LUCC, I selected the site for a case
study, which I conducted in 2011. Based on the case study results,
the erosion-prone hill site is not simply to be seen as an example of
upland farmers’ unsustainable cultivation practices, but as a battle-
ﬁeld of historically rooted conﬂicts over land, with soil erosion
being a result of these conﬂicts.village of Binangun was identiﬁed as one of the most erosion-prone sites within the
d use change area east of Binangun (LUCC area B) shares a similar history.
Fig. 3. Cassava cultivation on partly very steep slopes without ﬁeld terraces results
in high levels of erosion. The photo was taken in LUCC area A. Though farmers have
planted a few trees in some parts of the area, they hesitate to invest in additional
soil conservation measures as long as the land remains disputed.
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village patterns around Binangun in late colonial times, the follow-
ing sections shed light on partly violent displacements of people in
the 1950/60s and related contemporary struggles over land, which
are the immediate cause for soil erosion.
Looking back: disappeared villages and expanded state forest
territories
Recounting memories from their childhood and narratives of
their parents, elderly people of Binangun described the 1920s
and 1930s as a time when the population was small and land abun-
dant, with individual farmers owning between 2 and 20 ha of land.
The valley ﬂoors were used for wet rice cultivation, and the hill
slopes comprised coffee gardens and mixed forests with fruit and
timber trees. In addition to the present village of Binangun, which
is situated in a wide valley ﬂoor (see Fig. 2), there were numerous
smaller villages within the hill land east and northeast of
Binangun. Contemporary topographical maps depict this entire
area as state forest land without any sign of presently or formerly
existing villages (see Fig. 2). Prompted by my respondents’
accounts, I found precise evidence of the formerly existing villages
in a historical map, representing the situation around 1925/26 (see
Fig. 4). These villages have since disappeared, and the entire area
has become state forest territory (see Fig. 2).
A ﬁrst piece of village land became state forest as early as 1924,
when the Dutch administration purchased an area of comprising
the upper reaches of the mountains east of Groenggang, a sub-vil-
lage of Bringkeng, for conservation purposes. This purchase was
part of broader forest conservation efforts in Java (see Galudra
and Sirait, 2006, Kerbert, 1916, Zwart, 1928). Legal evidence of this
purchase, which did not affect residential areas, exists, and the ten-
ure status of the purchased land is not disputed today. This area is
located northeast of the erosion-prone hill site. It is presently
partly planted with teak.
Brutal times and ﬁrst violent displacement
Present conﬂicts and soil erosion are rooted in the political
dynamics of the 1950s and 1960s. In the early 1950s, the moun-
tainous areas east of Binangun became a base of the Dar’ul Islam,
an Islamist movement aiming at the new independent Republic
of Indonesia becoming an Islamic rather than a secular state. The
formation, ideology, strategies and organisational dynamics ofthe Dar’ul Islam have been explored in-depth by Horikoshi
(1975), Jackson (1980), van Dijk (1981), and Dengel (1986). How-
ever, none of their maps and lists of locations include the region
of the sub-districts Kawunganten and Jeruklegi that my case study
shows to be another former base of Dar’ul Islam rebels. Also com-
paratively little knowledge exists about the local violent dynamics
in rural and particularly forest areas that Dar’ul Islam rebels used
as hideouts and about the resulting spatial patterns of migrations
of rural populations. Peluso (1992) provided some insight into
the relations between villagers, Dar’ul Islam rebels and the
Indonesian National Army (TNI), with the former being caught in
the violent encounters between the latter two. She also shed light
on forest destructions by TNI forces aimed at destroying the rebels’
hideouts.
Elder residents whom I interviewed in Binangun and other vil-
lages nearby described the Dar’ul Islam encounter in their area as a
traumatic period. The rebels were based in the forest areas
between Binangun, Mentasan and Citepus (see Fig. 2). They asked
villagers for food and tried to recruit them. Those who refused
were shot. My respondents described in detail how the rebels
plundered and burnt houses, ‘slaughtered’ people and cut their
bodies into pieces. Also some of the village board members of
Bringkeng were killed. The ﬁrst residents, feeling highly insecure,
started leaving the area as early as 1951, secretly at night leaving
behind all their belongings and cattle. Their dwellings provided
additional bases for the Dar’ul Islam rebels. Later, refugee camps
were set up in Sarwadadi, Cilacap and other places, and villagers
were, partly by force, evacuated by state authorities and the TNI.
The TNI fought against the Dar’ul Islam rebels. Since the rebels
had recruited villagers and partly lived side by side with them, it
was difﬁcult for TNI forces to distinguish between rebels and
ordinary people. Therefore villagers were consequently evacuated.
By the mid-1950s, all residents who had not been killed or
recruited by the rebels had left the area.
People sent into the swamp forest
The TNI, together with state authorities, including the district
administration and village heads, decided then to move the dis-
placed residents permanently to a safe place. They designed a land
swap. Accordingly, parts of the village of Binangun as well as the
entire villages of Grugu, Bringkeng and Babakan (see Fig. 4) were
to be moved into an area just north of the Segara Anakan lagoon.
This area had been state forest territory before. It was to be given
to the people in exchange for their previous village land, which was
beleaguered by Dar’ul Islam rebels and which was to become part
of the state forest territory.
What at ﬁrst glance appears as a humanitarian act, turned out
to be a bad deal for the residents of the evacuated villages. The
new land they were to receive was supposed to be the same size
as their former village land. However, the quality of the land and
its suitability for agriculture was very different. A number of
respondents described the land provided as unfertile swamp land
with high levels of salinity. Parts of the land were still covered with
swamp forest. This land was difﬁcult to reclaim and was ﬂooded
waist-deep for several months every year. The peasants did not
receive any support in reclaiming the land, but, as one respondent
noted, ‘‘[. . .] were just sent to this swamp area.’’
The displaced had no choice but to accept what was offered.
Some of them reportedly did not even know about the agreement.
Others were made to sign agreements. Since the swamp land was
very difﬁcult to reclaim and to cultivate, and given that the dis-
placed people were in a desperate situation, forced to live from
hand to mouth after having lost everything, many of them had
no choice but to sell the piece of swamp land received in return
for minimal payments or even only for some food. Out of hundreds
Fig. 4. Until the 1950s, numerous smaller villages and sub-villages were located in the hill land east and northeast of Binangun, as evidenced by historical maps produced in
the 1920s.
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head, the village secretary, two traditional healers, and an addi-
tional ten residents actually moved to what was to be set up as
the new village ‘Bringkeng Baru’ (‘New Bringkeng’) in the swamp
land. The large majority of the displaced, however, either had no
other option than to cheaply sell off their part of the swamp land
immediately or did not even receive any land. The latter was due
to the fact that (1) some of the land reportedly had already been
cultivated by other farmers since the Japanese occupation 1942–
45, and (2) the total area provided in the swamp land was, contrary
to the initial agreement, smaller than the previous village land.
Some of the displaced people were told by their village head that
they could not get any land, since the area was too small.
First return of the displaced
Consequently, those who ended empty-handed moved back
home as soon as the security situation allowed. In 1961, just before
the national leader of the Dar’ul Islam, Kartosuwirjo, was captured,
the Dar’ul Islam rebels between Binangun, Mentasan and Citepus
were brought under control. The last 15 rebels surrendered, and
a military and police base remained at the former villages of Grugu
and Bringkeng only until 1962. Many of the displaced villagers,
including the village secretary of Bringkeng, moved back home,
started rebuilding their houses, which had all been destroyed,
and cultivated their former land.However, legally they were not allowed to return, since accord-
ing to the land swap agreement their land had become state forest
territory. In other words, peasants were faced with the choice of
either being landless or illegally returning back home. These
circumstances made some of them become politically engaged
and join the Barisan Tani Indonesia (BTI), the Peasants Front of
Indonesia, which was associated with the Communist Party of
Indonesia (PKI), and which called for land reform (cf. Peluso
et al., 2008). Reﬂecting on the initiation and consequences of the
land swap agreement, a village representative of Bringkeng Baru
noted: ‘‘Some people didn’t get any new land. They thus retuned
to Old Bringkeng, and the land swap issue turned from a security
problem [referring to the Dar’ul Islam] into a political problem
[referring to the status of illegality and the PKI].’’
Second violent displacement: ‘‘Your land or your life’’
The profound change in the political landscape of Indonesia in
1965 brought about a second violent displacement of those who
had returned to their former villages. The killing of six army gener-
als in Jakarta on 30th September 1965, which military heads
claimed to be an attempted coup by the PKI against the state,
served as a starting point and justiﬁcation for the formation of
an authoritarian, militarised state and an anti-communist purge,
which became one of the largest massacres of the 20th century,
with an estimated half a million killings (Cribb, 1990, 2001).
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labelled PKI members in 1965. They were forced to leave, and their
houses were burnt down. People were faced with the choice of
losing ‘‘their land or their lives’’, as one village representative suc-
cinctly stated. Many people were killed or put into prison and
tortured.
One respondent, a father of six young children, was imprisoned
on nearby Nusa Kambangan Island for ten years, where he ‘‘had to
study suffering’’. Together with tens of thousands of other prison-
ers, he was forced to work. Apart from being forced to clear entire
slopes of extremely deep-rooted, sharp alang-alang grass (Imperata
cylindrica) by hand and from working in quarries, his labour con-
tributed to the building of the roads between Jeruklegi, Wangon
and Lumbir, of a tennis court for the staff of a military camp, and
of a military chief’s private house. He was also engaged as a house-
hold servant for another military chief. His wife had no choice but
to get divorced and re-married to a military ofﬁcer. After ten years
he was released from prison. In his release report it reads that he
could not be convicted with certainty of having been a PKI mem-
ber. He still had to report to police and military ofﬁces regularly
for two years, and his registration card contains an entry labelling
him as political opponent, denied of many rights and freedoms. He
lives in poverty today and depends on food and money from his
neighbours and children. This is only one of many tragic life histo-
ries that shall illustrate the repression and violence and the deeply
engrained historical injustices that must be considered in trying to
understand contemporary land conﬂicts and resulting soil erosion.
Village land transformed into state forest land, an era of repression
The displacements of 1965 were consistent and permanent. The
villages between Binangun, Mentasan and Citepus vanished from
the face of the earth (Fig. 5). Almost the entire area immediately
started to be managed by P.N. Perhutani, the state forest corpora-
tion. The area was delineated, partitioned into forest divisions
and incorporated into the forest administrative system of Perhu-
tani. It was immediately planted with teak.
Only one small piece of land in the midst of the new state forest
territory remained in the hands of its former owner. I had identi-
ﬁed it in the satellite images, since its land cover differed, and even
topographical maps correctly delineate it as private land (see Fig. 2,
red circle). This land belonged to a forest guard in the 1950s and
1960s, who, due to his personal connections, was free to choose
not to give up his land.
The other peasants had to give way to the expansion of the state
forest territory. During the New Order regime that General Suharto
started to establish in 1965 and that remained in power until 1998,
the displaced had no chance to claim the land they lost, no chance
to secure justice. Relations between the villagers and the state and
its forest corporation were marked by repression, anxiety and
hatred, as the following statements made during a discussion with
peasants and a village representative aptly summarise:
‘‘During the entire New Order regime the people were afraid to
take any trees from Perhutani land not to mention to claim any
land ownership.’’‘‘During the New Order Regime you should be in line with the
state bureaucracy, and if you were not, there were three
choices: You were declared an obstacle to development, a mem-
ber of the Dar’ul Islam, or a PKI member. The last option was the
most common one.’’
‘‘I was afraid to complain. They would have labelled me as com-
munist and killed me.’’‘‘Perhutani is like a child of the government. Whenever there
were problems between Perhutani and the people, the
government intervened. People just had to develop hatred
against Perhutani over time.’’
Peasants’ access to the long-standing as well as the new state
forest territories was strictly limited. As common all over Java, they
were allowed to cultivate annual crops between newly planted
trees for the ﬁrst few years after planting (a system known as
tumpangsari, see Peluso, 1992), but for the related permits peas-
ants of Binangun had to make informal payment into the private
pockets of the forest guards and forest labour foremen (mantri
and mandor). Despite the state forest corporation’s policing efforts,
villagers continued to exploit resources from state forests, and in
line with the tenure status of the land, they did so carelessly, which
resulted in forest degradation in many parts of Java (Nibbering,
1988, Peluso, 1992).Summing up: Insurgencies and counterinsurgencies and the
territorialisation of productive forest resources by the state
The case presented here provides a concrete and particularly
insightful piece of empirical evidence of the links that Vandergeest
and Peluso sketched between political insurgencies, counterinsur-
gencies and the consolidation of postcolonial states and political
forests in Southeast Asia (Peluso and Vandergeest, 2011,
Vandergeest and Peluso, 2011). In this case, as described above
and further discussed below, a series of partly brutal insurgencies
and counterinsurgencies provided an opportunity for, served to
justify or was part of the expansion of state forest territory at the
expense of village land.
The ﬁrst displacements were, in the beginning, related to the
Dar’ul Islam insurgency. People, who feared for their lives, ﬂed
on their own initiative. Later, these displacements culminated in
state-led evacuations as part of and to support an effective coun-
terinsurgency of the TNI against the Dar’ul Islam rebels.
These ﬁrst displacements in the 1950s would have been only
temporary had state authorities not designed a land swap. The
Dar’ul Islam insurgency and the need for an effective counterinsur-
gency required, or perhaps rather provided a good opportunity for,
the land swap. Clearly disentangling the different motivations that
led to the initiation of the land swap during this chaotic time is
rather challenging in retrospect. However, based on a number of
considerations and statements from my respondents, it appears
that the land swap might not have been primarily driven by
humanitarian concerns, but to a substantial extent by the interest
of the state and its forest administration to depopulate a politically
fragile area, to territorialise economically productive forest land in
the hills and to provide in exchange a piece of what must have
been regarded as economically unproductive swamp (forest) land.
These considerations and statements shall brieﬂy be summarised
in the following.
Asked about the government’s main motivation for the land
swap, a village representative explained that ‘‘the area had become
a base of the Dar’ul Islam. They plundered and burnt houses and
slaughtered people, who were afraid and ﬂed. The government
and Perhutani used the situation to resettle people. The govern-
ment wanted the area to become Perhutani land.’’ Asked why the
then-village head of Bringkeng had signed a land swap agreement
which was obviously disadvantageous for the villagers, a current
village representative explained that ‘‘all state authorities, includ-
ing the district and sub-district heads, formed a strong alliance that
was hated by the people. And the village head was pressured under
the condition of not having any village land in the 1950s. New land,
wherever, was urgently needed. So he might not have had any
other choice.’’ Since the land provided in the swamp area was
Fig. 5. The villages located in the hill land east and northeast of Binangun vanished from the face of the earth in the 1950–1960s, and the land became part of the state forest
territory. This map of the disappeared villages is based on an overlay of a contemporary topographical map (Fig. 2) with a historical map representing the situation in the
1920s (Fig. 4).
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asked for additional land to fulﬁl the agreement. However, as the
same respondent explained: ‘‘There was no chance for that. Gov-
ernment structures were extremely hierarchical, and the Bupati
[head of the district] was still part of the royal family at that time.
It was a feudalistic society. He was far above the people. His face
was not allowed to be seen by the people and the village heads.
It was completely covered with cloth.’’ Given the different land
sizes and land qualities and the way of implementation, the land
swap was obviously not fair on paper and even more unfair in
practice, but was pushed by repressive state authorities.
Those who returned home to their land in the early 1960s were
considered illegal. This status triggered political resistance and
made some of the allegedly illegal peasants to link with networks
associated with the PKI. This insurgency of peasants against the
territorialisation of their land by the state and its forest adminis-
tration was brutally struck down in the frame of the anti-com-
munist military-led counterinsurgency of 1965/66. The portrayal
of the killing of six army generals in Jakarta as a violent act of
the PKI against the state and the labelling and criminalisation of
all those who had returned to their land as PKI members served
as justiﬁcation for a counterinsurgency, for the violent displace-
ment of the returnees, hence clearing the way for territorialising
their land.
This territorialisation (cf. Peluso and Vandergeest, 2001,
Vandergeest and Peluso, 1995), which was inextricably linked witha series of two insurgencies and counterinsurgencies, involved vio-
lent displacements; the delineation of former village land and its
partition into forest divisions, rendering village borders irrelevant;
the incorporation of the land into the administrative system of the
state forest corporation; and restriction of peoples’ access to the
land and its resources, which was enforced by armed forest police.
The immediate planting of teak in the new state forest territory
underlines the state’s interest in the area’s productive resources.
Teak was (and still is) economically the far most important species
for the state forest corporation. The Department of Forestry aimed
at doubling teak exports, which had already increased 2.5-fold
between 1965 and 1968 (Direktorat Djenderal Kehutanan, 1969),
‘‘for the development of [the] national economy and [the] prosper-
ity of the people’’ (Department of Forestry, 1966). The swamp for-
est, given to the villagers in exchange, was not suitable for growing
teak.
Also ideas and aims within the forest administration about
watershed conservation supported the land swap. One respondent,
who had been working for the state forest administration in the
1950s, explained that the new land provided to the peasants was
well suitable for farming, whereas their former hill land was most
suitable for forest. He subsequently highlighted the hydrological
functions of forest cover on the hill land.
To sum up, the land between Binangun, Mentasan and Citepus
had in the 1950s and 1960s become a battleﬁeld of violent strug-
gles over political power. All three of the major political forces that
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Republic of Indonesia, namely the Dar’ul Islam, communist groups
(PKI) and the Military (TNI), and the violent confrontations
between these forces, profoundly reshaped the landscape in this
region, disrupted social life, brutally erased entire villages and
many people, and provided scope for and was inextricably linked
with the territorialisation of village land as state forest. The previ-
ous land use mosaic of scattered villages, agricultural land and
mixed forests was transformed into production forests, comprising
one-age-cohort teak and pine plantations, managed by the state
forest corporation. These forest plantations and occasional clear
cuts dominated the scene until the mid-1990s, as can be seen from
the satellite images analysed. While the hill land was transformed
into a state forest plantation, the ‘relocation’ of the villages initi-
ated the gradual transformation of substantial mangrove and
swamp forest areas in the northern part of the Segara Anakan
lagoon region into rice ﬁelds and settlements (Fig. 6-1 and 6-2).Political forests turned into erosion-prone battleﬁelds
While the villages in the hill land vanished from the face of the
earth, they continued to exist on historical maps and in the mem-
ories of the displaced and their descendants. The fall of the Suharto
regime in 1997/98 provided the historical chance for the displaced
as well as for large parts of the entire population to (re-)gain access
to the state forests, or the ‘political forests’ which Peluso and
Vandergeest (2001:762) deﬁned as ‘‘lands states declare as for-
ests’’. About half of the state forests in the area around Binangun
were cut down within a few years. Almost every family from the
villages surrounding the state forest, as well as outsiders from
the nearby regions and towns participated and beneﬁted. Illegal
logging became a big business, involving loggers, porters, truck
businesses and traders. The forests around Binangun had been
ready for harvest, and Perhutani had already built roads and
bridges within the forests to prepare the harvest and transport of
timber. This provided perfect conditions for the illegal loggers.
About ten trucks loaded with timber passed through Binangun
every day. Even truckloads of security personal that arrived in
the beginning were not able to, were afraid to or got paid to not
interfere. The house of a Perhutani ofﬁcer who aimed at enforcing
state forest law and order was attacked. ‘Illegal’ logging went on
until most trees were cut down. Around the mid-2000s, some areas
were reforested by Perhutani, while other areas remained occupied
by peasants, who not only harvested trees, but claimed land own-
ership for historical reasons.Second return of the displaced
The hill area north of the village of Binangun that I had identi-
ﬁed in the satellite images and based on land cover mapping as a
major erosion prone site (see Fig. 2, LUCC area A), is one of the state
forest areas claimed by peasants. The same applies to a larger area
east of Binangun (see Fig. 2, LUCC area B). Until the early 1950s, the
hill site north of Binangun (LUCC area A) had been part of the for-
mer village of Bringkeng. The hill site east of Binangun (LUCC area
B) had been part of the former village of Grugu. Those who were
displaced from Bringkeng and Grugu in the 1950/60s or their
descendants and other villagers claim ownership over this land.
Their claims are based on the fact that (1) the swamp land received
in the 1950/60s was smaller than their original village land, and (2)
most residents of the former villages did not sign and even did not
get to know about the land swap agreement. In the case of Bringk-
eng, the villagers were to receive only 434.8 ha of swamp land in
exchange for their 614.8 ha of fertile hill land. Therefore the peas-
ants claim ownership over an area of 180 ha. In the case of Grugu,
the peasants claim an area of about 200 ha.The land areas claimed almost perfectly match spatially with
the areas that I had identiﬁed as erosion-prone land based on the
satellite images and land cover mapping. The conﬂict between
peasants and the state forest corporation has literally turned this
land into an erosion-prone battleﬁeld. The land was cleared of its
forest and has been cultivated by hundreds of peasants since then.
In line with the disputed land ownership status, limiting the peas-
ants’ planning horizon, they have mainly grown annual crops.
Growing these crops on steep slopes without ﬁeld terraces and tree
cover has resulted in high levels of erosion. This landscape of ero-
sion is an ‘inscription’ of the ongoing, historically rooted struggle
over land.
A group of farmers took the lead in ﬁghting for land rights. They
set up a ﬁrst dwelling at the foot of the hill, which serves as a tem-
porary residence and base camp of a farmers’ committee, which
they established as representation of the peasants cultivating and
claiming land.
‘‘It’s like war with Perhutani’’
At the time of ﬁeld research in 2011, the conﬂict between the
peasants and the state forest corporation over the land had been
ongoing for a decade. This conﬂict has involved various formal
and informal processes, and modes of indirect and direct confron-
tation. Reﬂecting on the course of the conﬂict and the current
situation, one respondent noted: ‘‘It’s like war with Perhutani.’’
Perhutani, with support from the police, tried to move the peas-
ants off the land, ‘‘but hundreds of people were brave enough to
stay’’ (a village representative). The peasants approached the head
of Perhutani’s forest district ofﬁce. Since their hand-drawn maps
were not accepted as evidence, they managed to organise a precise
cadastral map of the former villages of Bringkeng and Grugu dated
1937 from the Military Topographic Service. The claimed land as
depicted in this cadastral map almost perfectly overlays with the
state forest land currently cultivated by peasants as depicted in
the satellite image.
Perhutani reportedly regards the land swap of the 1950s as
accurate, referring to a second purchase of 170 ha of village land
by the Dutch administration in 1934. However, evidence of this
alleged second purchase does obviously not exist. On the contrary,
the cadastral map of 1937 depicts the corresponding area as village
land, and according to elderly people, maps and border markers of
Bringkeng did not change between 1925 and the 1950s. The villag-
ers engaged two lawyers and staged two demonstrations in the
district town of Cilacap.
In the early 2000s, Perhutani and representatives from the sub-
district administration offered an agreement, allowing peasants to
cultivate the disputed land for 25 years, followed by a re-evalua-
tion. At the same time, the agreement declared the disputed land
as state forest land, hence reinforcing the ownership status quo.
Many peasants were not aware of the latter and assumed they
were granted ownership rights. The agreement also laid the foun-
dation for the establishment of community forestry (PHBM:
Pengelolaan Hutan Bersama Masyarakat). In the frame of PHPM
schemes, which have been initiated throughout Java since the early
2000s, Perhutani continues to control the selection, planting and
management of trees, while local residents have temporarily lim-
ited cultivation rights (tumpangsari), are responsible for safe-
guarding the trees and receive a share of the revenue. PHBM, as
Singer (2009:133) aptly summarised, ‘‘can either be viewed as a
break with the past as local populations can beneﬁt directly from
the income from the forest, or perceived as yet another way of buy-
ing local people out of their legitimate rights to the forest.’’ Based
on the latter viewpoint, Maryudi (2012) explored PHBM as a strat-
egy of the state to regain control over the forests.
In the case of the land dispute investigated here, tricking peas-
ants into a PHBM scheme, hence granting them limited access and
Fig. 6. (6-1 and 6-2) The historical topographical map of the north-eastern section of the Segara Anakan lagoon depicts expansive mangrove and swamp forest areas. The
‘relocation’ of the villages Grugu, Bringkeng and Babakan and parts of the village of Binangun initiated the transformation of large parts of this mangrove and swamp forest
into rice ﬁelds and settlements. Though most residents from the ‘disappeared’ villages reportedly did not receive any new land, the new villages of Bringkeng, Grugu and
Babakan, and the sub-villages Binangunbaru 1–3 have grown over time. Thus, the former mangrove and swamp forests have been replaced by villages and wet rice ﬁelds.
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M.C. Lukas / Geoforum 56 (2014) 87–100 97control over the land, undoubtedly appears as a strategy to regain
control over the disputed land and to maintain the land ownership
status quo. The peasants did not know for years what PHPM was
until Perhutani started planting trees on the disputed land in
2008/2009. Upset about seeing Perhutani planting trees on ‘their’
land and regarding the tree planting as a strategy of Perhutani to
re-territorialise ‘their’ land, the peasants pulled out the newly
planted seedlings. This led Perhutani to engage the police, which
resulted in tense encounters on the conﬂict land, involving a knife
threat.
This open confrontation generated political attention up to the
national level. The case was discussed in the national parliament in
2009, and the Ministry of Forestry recommended a survey of the
historical village land. The survey was supposed to be carried out
by a team formed by Perhutani. The peasants fear that they have
to bear the costs, and at the time of the research in 2011, they were
disappointed that nothing had happened yet. One respondent
shared his concern that the process might intentionally be delayed
until the last eye witnesses have died.
Tensions and confrontations on the ground between Perhutani
and peasants have been going on in the meantime. Peasants are
upset about Perhutani staff walking around on ‘their’ land and set-
ting border markers. At the end of a discussion, a group of peasants
conﬁded in me that they had been afraid of talking to me in the
beginning, because sometimes spies arrived and interrogated them
without letting them know that they worked on behalf of
Perhutani. One respondent added: ‘‘We are in trauma.’’
Erosion-prone battleﬁelds
Having shed light on the history of two violent displacements,
the territorialisation of former village land by the state and its for-
est corporation, and the dynamics of the resulting contemporary
land conﬂicts, we return to the starting point of the case study:
the issue of soil erosion in the catchment area of the Segara Anakan
lagoon. Together with the research we have conducted in other
parts of the watershed, the case presented here illustratively shows
that blaming upland farmers’ unsustainable farming practices for
being the single-most important cause of soil erosion and lagoon
sedimentation is a misleading, far too simplistic political narrative.
During the past years, the disputed, partly very steep land has
been cultivated by peasants mainly with annual crops, which,
due to the lack of ﬁeld terraces or tree cover, has resulted in high
levels of erosion. However, these cultivation practices are not peas-
ants’ preferred way of farming, but a result of the smouldering land
conﬂict. Without having been asked and without knowing that
LUCC and soil erosion were my points of departure for this
research, a group of peasants explained that they would usually
plant tree crops on such land, intercropped with annuals only dur-
ing the ﬁrst years, but that they had to postpone such investments
until the tenure status of the land is clariﬁed.
The representatives of the farmers’ committee are aware of the
relation between upland degradation and ﬂooding and sedimenta-
tion. In fact, the committee comprises one person responsible for
soil conservation. The farmers already have plans for investments
into land terracing and irrigation. This will, as they explained,
not only limit erosion, but reduce nutrient washout and increase
yields. To some extent, the committee’s commitment to soil con-
servation might be a political strategy to counter political dis-
courses about farmers’ allegedly unsustainable farming practices
that commonly serve as arguments to keep them out of the ‘state
forest land’. As aptly formulated by Peluso et al. (2008), ‘‘[t]he
landscapes of occupation must appear sustainably managed’’. In
fact, some farmers have already planted some trees in the steeper
portions of the slope (Fig. 3) and have converted a small area at the
foot of the hill slope into terraced rice ﬁelds. Terraced rice ﬁelds
and (mainly mixed) forests dominate large parts of the privatelyowned land in the lagoon’s catchment area, and there has been a
general trend of shifting from annual to tree crops in many parts
of Java over the past years.
However, as long as the land conﬂict is not settled, the peasants
will not further invest into ﬁeld terraces, irrigation schemes and
trees, at least not on a large scale. They demonstrate their claim
over the land by cultivating it with annual crops. The state forest
corporation on its part demonstrated its claim over the land by
planting trees. Countering this territorialisation strategy, the peas-
ants pulled the seedlings out. In other words, the bare, erosion-
prone hill slopes have to be seen as battleﬁelds of historically
rooted conﬂicts over land, with erosion being a direct outcome of
these conﬂicts. Without a satisfactory and just resolution of these
conﬂicts, taking into account the history of violent and unfair dis-
placements, the land will likely continue to be prone to erosion.
Power dynamics and conﬂicts at the grassroots level and the formation
of a ‘land maﬁa’
The story about the erosion-prone conﬂict land does not end
here. It would be too superﬁcial without shedding light on problem-
atic strategies, power dynamics and conﬂicts at the grassroots level,
which have started to impede the political and legal processes that
could potentially lead to a resolution of the land conﬂict and hence
to reduced soil erosion. Asked whether he was optimistic that the
peasants would ﬁnally receive land rights, an insider noted that
they had ‘‘made a big mistake’’. Details of these dynamics were
rather difﬁcult to grasp, since they had created lines of conﬂict
within the village. The information presented in the following
was conﬁrmed by and cross-checkedwith a number of respondents
and hence likely provides a correct albeit not complete picture.
The partition of the claimed and occupied state forest land
between peasants is an intricate task. Since the land is occupied
illegally, its partition among peasants is an informal process at
the grassroots level. Many of those who were displaced in the
1950/60s have passed away, and documents of historical individ-
ual land tenure barely exist. It is hence difﬁcult to determine
who had owned which part of the previous village land. So who
should receive how much land? According to a village representa-
tive of Bringkeng, a village forum had compiled a list of residents
who had lived in the original village before 1951, and it was
planned that both the former land owners and former landless
were to ‘receive’ a piece of land.
However, in practice, representatives of the farmers’ committee,
which was set up as a representation and action group of those
who claimed land and which itself consisted of farmers, started
selling cultivation rights. Starting from around 2006, everybody
who wanted to cultivate and claim part of the disputed land had
to pay for their informal right to cultivate. One villager noted that
(parts of) the farmers’ committee had turned into a ‘land maﬁa’
(‘maﬁa tanah’). This ‘land maﬁa’ forced peasants to pay by threat-
ening them to pull out their crops and noting that they would
otherwise lose their cultivation right. Afraid of losing their cultiva-
tion right, reportedly almost all, i.e. hundreds of peasants, paid IDR
19–25 million (approximately € 1.500–2.000) each for ‘their’ plot.
Informal cultivation rights for comparatively large areas up to
10 ha were reportedly also bought by outsiders from neighbouring
regions, who had no relation to the original village of Bringkeng.
Some of those who purchased informal cultivation rights assumed
they were buying the land, while others were aware that they only
bought the ‘right to claim the land’ hoping to become the formal
owners of the land after the resolution of the conﬂict with
Perhutani. The informal cultivation rights have even been resold,
often at higher prices. In addition to informally selling cultivation
rights for land that formally still belongs to the state, representa-
tives of the farmers’ committee collected money for travel costs
and legal processes from the other peasants. The informal sale of
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extent the former practices of the forest guards and forest labour
foremen, who collected informal payments from the villagers
who wanted to receive temporary cultivation rights in the frame
of tumpangsari.
Some village residentswho critically observed the formation and
practices of the ‘landmaﬁa’ encouraged those whowere required to
pay to report the case to the village head. However, most buyers
were afraid and did not admit their payment. The village board tried
to get more information, and the head of the PHBM community
forestry farmers’ group reported the issue to the Perhutani forest
district administration. At the time of the case study, the issue was
under examination, and both the farmers’ committee members
and the peasants who allegedly paid had not confessed.
The informal sale of cultivation rights for disputed state forest
land has contributed to, or is perhaps even used for, the discredit-
ing of those who ﬁght for land rights by a group of village represen-
tatives of Binangun who are cautious about or even in opposition
to the peasants’ land claim, who, in other words, tend to be on
the side of Perhutani. One of them is the head of the PHPM commu-
nity forestry farmers’ group. He had worked for Perhutani as a for-
est guard previously and had obviously been installed by Perhutani
to represent and enforce the state forest corporation’s interests
within the community. The persistence of such ‘fragments’ of the
former repressive power apparatus in community forestry
schemes has been explored in Lukas (2013). Also a representative
of the village board of Binangun opposed the peasants’ land claim.
He expressed his positive views on Perhutani’s PHBM policy and
noted that in his opinion, ‘‘the land is actually not conﬂict land,
because it had already been swapped in the 1950s’’.Summary and outlook
One of the most erosion-prone hillsides within the catchment
area of the Segara Anakan lagoon can be understood as an ‘inscrip-
tion’ of historically rooted conﬂicts over land, with erosion being
the direct outcome of these conﬂicts. The conﬂicts are rooted in a
series of insurgencies and counterinsurgencies in the 1950/60s,
which were inextricably linked to the struggles of the three major
political forces, namely the Dar’ul Islam, Communist groups and
the Military, over national political power within the newly inde-
pendent Republic of Indonesia. Displacements of people in the
wake of the brutal Dar’ul Islam insurgency and the state military’s
counterinsurgency in the 1950s provided an opportunity for the
expansion of state forest territory at the expense of village land.
A state-initiated land swap provided infertile swamp land to some
of the displaced peasants in exchange for their fertile hill land and
left the majority of them landless. Those who returned were vio-
lently evicted from the land in the mid-1960s within the scope
of the ‘anti-communist’ massacres that were part of the formation
of Suharto’s repressive military regime. Their land was henceforth
managed by the state forest corporation and converted into teak
and pine plantations. The fall of the Suharto regime in the late
1990s provided scope for a new insurgency. The displaced returned
and began to ﬁght for their land, to ﬁght for justice. Ongoing strug-
gles and confrontations between the peasants and the state forest
corporation have since then transformed the land into an erosion-
prone battleﬁeld. In other words, soil erosion is to be seen as a
material ﬂux running off the battleﬁelds of political conﬂicts over
resources. This landscape of erosion is a landscape of conﬂict and
a symbol of unresolved historical violence and injustice. A fair res-
olution of the land conﬂict, establishing historical justice as far as
this is still possible at this late stage, is obviously the most impor-
tant prerequisite for a more sustainable, soil conserving manage-
ment of the land.However, over the course of the conﬂict, a group of peasants
who took a lead in ﬁghting for land titles established itself as a
new dominator, exerting power over the other peasants and
requiring them to buy ‘informal cultivation rights’ or ‘rights to
claim’ the state forest land. With the formation of this ‘land maﬁa’
and with outsiders buying ‘cultivation rights’, the struggle over the
land being a struggle for historical justice for the displaced has
been diluted. Though these dynamics at the grassroots level
deserve critical attention and need to be addressed, they should
not distract from the need for a fair resolution of the historically
rooted land conﬂict between those who were violently displaced
including their descendants and the state with its forest corpora-
tion, which appropriated their land. The further course of the land
conﬂict is the main factor determining future land use and poten-
tial levels of erosion.Conclusion
In line with our research in other parts of the catchment area,
the case of the disappeared villages presented in this article shows
that the blaming of upland farmers’ unsustainable farming prac-
tices for being the single most important cause of soil erosion
and lagoon sedimentation is a one-sided, misleading political nar-
rative. Instead, some of the most erosion-prone land areas have to
be regarded as battleﬁelds of historically rooted conﬂicts between
peasants and the state and its forest corporation or between peas-
ants and plantation companies over land. In these conﬂicts, the
simplistic narratives about peasants’ unsustainable farming prac-
tices have served as justiﬁcation for keeping them away from the
state forest territories.
The case of the disappeared villages presented here is a
powerful example of the importance of taking into account
social-political histories and their shaping of contemporary strug-
gles and dynamics in trying to understand present land use pat-
terns and the causes of soil erosion. Research linking LUC(C)
science and (historical) political ecology can be particularly fruitful
in this context. An area-wide LUCC analysis served as the basis for
the identiﬁcation of political ecology case studies. Hence, observed
physical environmental changes served as the starting point of the
political ecology research, and not political networks or theoretical
considerations that may have an inbuilt preference for cases where
exogenous forces and political struggles disadvantage local land
users. Political ecology contributes to LUCC and soil degradation
science by analysing (historical) social-political dynamics and
struggles that are major causes of LUCC and soil erosion. Ignoring
these dynamics and struggles in analysing the causes of soil ero-
sion in Java does not just provide a superﬁcial understanding of
the situation but necessarily results in misleading conclusions.
The case study presented here clearly establishes direct causal
links between political struggles over the access to and control of
land and soil erosion. Historically rooted land conﬂicts have trans-
formed the land into an erosion-prone battleﬁeld, with soil erosion
being the outcome. Unresolved socio-political pasts, marked by
violence, problematic power relations, injustice, repression and
upheaval, and a history of conﬂicts over resources, all of which
are core issues of political ecology research, are inextricably and
causally linked with environmental degradation.Acknowledgements
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